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NOTES
Turning Back the Clock: A Judicial Return to
Caveat Emptor for U.S. Investors in Foreign
Markets
I. Introduction
The past forty years has seen an expansion of American business
into overseas commercial activities.' The rise in multinational transac-
tions has resulted in questions as to the appropriate forum for dispute
resolution. Supreme Court decisions show a trend favoring the en-
forcement of forum selection and arbitration clauses included in such
international contracts and agreements. 2 The Court has described
such clauses as an "indispensable element in international trade, com-
merce, and contracting."3 For example, in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.,4
the Court upheld an international arbitration clause in a securities
agreement in the interests of certainty and international comity de-
spite the public policy foundations of the Securities Act of 1933 and
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 5 The recent decision of the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Bonny v. Society of Lloyd's
applied the rationale of the Supreme Court's decisions favoring arbi-
tration to uphold international forum selection and choice-of-law
clauses in a securities transaction. 6 This decision effectively deprived
the plaintiffs of their statutory remedies under the 1933 Securities
Act.
7
This Note will explore the facts and holding of Bonny in Part II.
Part III will review the legislative intent behind the enactment of the
I See M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 8 (1972).
2 See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614
(1985); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
3 Bremen, 407 U.S. at 13-14.
4 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
5 The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 1933 and
1934 Acts) were enacted by Congress to protect U.S. investors by requiring "full and fair
disclosure of the character of securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce and to pre-
vent fraud in their sale." Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 431 (1953). To this end, each of the
Acts contains an anti-waiver provision, which makes void any "condition, stipulation, or provi-
sion" that results in a binding waiver of any rule or regulation of the Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77n
and 78cc(a) (1988). See infra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
6 Bonny v. Society of Lloyd's. 3 F.3d 156, 162 (1993).
7 Id.; see infra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
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1933 and 1934 Acts and the rationale behind the decisions of the U.S.
Supreme Court enforcing domestic and international arbitration
clauses. Part IV will provide an analysis of the court's opinion in Bonny.
This Note will conclude that the Supreme Court did not intend for its
decisions enforcing international arbitration clauses to result in U.S.
investors losing their statutory claims under the 1933 and 1934 Acts.
II. Statement of the Case: Bonny v. Society of Lloyd's
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently decided the
case of Bonny v. Society of Lloyd's.8 In Bonny, the Seventh Circuit consid-
ered whether forum selection and choice-of-law clauses (designating
that English law would apply to any disputes and conferring exclusive
jurisdiction on the courts of England) included in various agreements
between the parties should be enforced.9 The court upheld the "pre-
sumptive validity" of the clauses and dismissed plaintiffs' action1" based
on the following factors: (1) the agreements involved were interna-
tional in nature; (2) adequate remedies existed in the selected foreign
forum; and (3) the available remedies sufficiently deterred the subver-
sion of important American public policy."1
The Seventh Circuit first found that the action involved an inter-
national agreement. 12 The plaintiffs in the action were three U.S. in-
vestors who claimed they were "fraudulently, and in violation of various
federal and state securities laws, 13 induced to become members of the
Society of Lloyd's .... "14 The defendants were primarily British enti-
8 3 F.3d 156 (1993).
9 Id.
10 Id. at 157-59. Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin defendants from
drawing on irrevocable letters of credit executed by plaintiffs in favor of defendants that were
required as part of their membership in Lloyd's. See infra note 14.
11 Id. at 162. The Second Circuit considered substantially identical claims against
Lloyd's and also held the clauses enforceable against the U.S. investors. See Roby v. Corpora-
tion of Lloyd's, 996 F.2d 1353 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 385 (1993).
12 Bonny, 3 F.3d at 159 & n.9.
13 The plaintiffs brought suit under §§ 12(1) and 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933,
§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.
Additionally, plaintiffs asserted various common law claims and RICO Act (Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organizations) violations. See infra notes 145-47 and 157. Specifically,
the complaint alleged that plaintiffs were induced to become "Names" (see infra note 14)
based on the non-disclosure of material facts and risk factors concerning investing in Lloyd's.
Bonny, 3 F.3d at 157-59.
14 Bonny, 3 F.3d at 157. "[Lloyd's] is a market somewhat analogous to the New York
Stock Exchange" that operates a worldwide insurance market. Id. at 158-59 & n.2. An indi-
vidual can invest and participate in the Lloyd's insurance underwriting syndicates by becom-
ing an Underwriting Member (a "Name"). Id. A Name cannot deal directly with Lloyd's but
instead must invest through a "Member Agent" who must act "in the sole interest of [his/her]
principal Names." Id. Although a Name can select in which syndicates to invest and how
much to invest, most Names rely on their Member Agents for advice, because only limited
financial information is available to the Name. Id.
Each syndicate (which may specialize in a certain type of insurance) is separately man-
aged by a "Managing Agent" who is responsible only for his/her syndicate. Id. A Name
shares proportionately in a syndicate's profits and accordingly is only responsible for his/her
1994] PROTECTION OF U.S. INVESTORS
ties and individuals.15 Although the plaintiffs were solicited in the
United States to invest in Lloyd's, the court found it significant that
they traveled to England to sign the "General Undertaking for Mem-
bership"16 and that Lloyd's operations are worldwide.' 7 On this basis,
the court concluded that "[tihere is no question that the transaction
involved here is truly international."' 8
Having found an international agreement, the Seventh Circuit
cited the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-
Shore Co.19 (a case not involving securities) that "forum selection clauses
are 'prima facie valid and should be enforced unless enforcement is
shown by the resisting party to be unreasonable under the circum-
stances.'"20 The Seventh Circuit then noted that the Supreme Court's
interpretation of an unreasonable enforcement was limited to the fol-
lowing situations: (1) where the clauses were incorporated as a result
of "fraud, undue influence or overweening bargaining power";21 (2)
where the forum selected is so "gravely difficult and inconvenient that
[the complaining party] will for all practical purposes be deprived of its
day in court";22 or (3) where "enforcement of the clauses contravene a
proportionate share of a syndicate's losses (i.e., there is no joint and several liability); but, the
liability for that share is unlimited. Id. To protect against losses in excess of a Name's invest-
ment, Names are required to issue an irrevocable letter of credit in favor of Lloyd's. Id. If
such losses arise, a "cash call" will be made and if the Name does not pay the loss directly,
Lloyd's will draw against the letter of credit. Id.
Names also must enter into several contractual arrangements. Id. A Name must sign a
General Undertaking for Membership with Lloyd's, which includes forum selection and
choice-of-law clauses designating that English law is to apply and that courts of England have
exclusive jurisdiction over all disputes. Id. Names must also enter into a Members' Agent
Agreement with their selected Member Agent which provides that any disputes will be arbi-
trated in England under English law. Id. Names do not enter into any direct agreement with
the Managing Agents, but the Member Agents' Agreement gives the Member Agent the
power to enter agreements with Managing Agents on the Name's behalf. Id.
15 The defendants included (1) The Society of Lloyd's (Lloyd's), Lime Street Under-
writing Agencies Ltd. (Lime Street), Bankside Underwriting Agencies, Ltd., Robin C. Kings-
ley, Robert C. Hallam, Patrick M. Corbett (British entities, corporations or individuals;
collectively the Members' Agents); (2) Harris Bank Glencoe-Northbrook N.A., Harris Trust
and Savings Bank, and Bank of Montreal (Bank defendants); and (3) Northfield Venture,
Inc., Robert King, and Alan J. Hunken (U.S. corporation and its principals). Id. at 157.
16 See supra note 14.
17 Bonny, 3 F.3d at 159 n.9.
18 Id.
19 407 U.S. 1 (1972). See infra note 60.
20 Bonny, 3 F.3d at 159 (quoting MIS Bremen, 407 U.S. at 10).
21 Id. at 160. Plaintiffs asserted fraud in the incorporation of the forum selection and
choice-of-law clauses based on nondisclosures by the defendants that Lloyd's was immune for
certain causes of action under the Lloyd's Act of 1982. Id. See infra notes 142-49 and accom-
panying text. Similarly, the plaintiffs asserted fraud related to the nondisclosure that Lloyd's
and Lime Street are "exempt" persons under English securities laws. Bonny, 3 F.3d at 160
n.10. Without addressing the validity of these assertions, the Seventh Circuit dismissed them
based on the "fundamental principle of contract law that a person who signs a contract is
presumed to know its terms and consents to be bound by them." Id. (citing 3 A. CORBIN,
CORBIN ON CoNTRAmTS 607 (1989)).
22 Bonny, 3 F.3d at 160 (quoting M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 18
(1972)). The Seventh Circuit noted that although the plaintiffs have lost significant amounts
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strong public policy of the forum in which the suit is brought, declared
by statute or judicial decision." 23
After summarily dismissing the first two situations as not applica-
ble to the case at bar,2 4 the Seventh Circuit discussed plaintiffs' conten-
tion that such clauses violate important American public policy
embedded in the 1933 and 1934 Acts.2 5 The court acknowledged that
allowing "Lloyd's to avoid liability for putative violations of the 1933
Act would contravene important American policies unless remedies
available in the selected forum do not subvert the public policy of that
Act."26 However, the court determined that adequate remedies ex-
isted under English law that would not subvert the policy of the 1933
and 1934 Acts: 27
As to the adequacy of the potential remedies, the Seventh Circuit
noted that plaintiffs would have causes of action under English com-
mon law for fraud (which the court analogized to a Rule 10b-5 claim),
rescission of contract, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary du-
ties.28 In addition, if defendants were found guilty under Section 47 of
the Financial Services Act of 1986,29 then under Section 61 of such Act,
the English court would be permitted, upon "application of the Secre-
tary of State, to order injunctions to restrain violations of [Section] 47
and to make remedial orders."30 The court noted that this could "po-
tentially" result in "some" compensation to plaintiffs for their inju-
ries.3 1 Finally, the court noted that even though some of these claims
would not be available because of certain immunities extended to
Lloyd's under the Lloyd's Act of 1982, Lloyd's would not be immune
for acts "done in bad faith."32
As to the potential subversion of American public policy, the Sev-
enth Circuit concluded that the "available remedies and potential
damage recoveries [do not subvert American public policy because
of money (plaintiffs combined losses exceed £550,000) and it may be difficult for them to
litigate in England, financial condition at the time in which the agreements were originally
entered is the measure for grave inconvenience, not financial condition at the time of suit.
Id. at 160 n.11.
23 Id. at 160 (citing MIS Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15).
24 See supra notes 21-22.
25 Bonny, 3 F.3d at 160-62. See supra note 5.
26 Bonny, 3 F.3d at 161.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 The Financial Services Act is the regulatory statute that governs the English securities
industry. Bonny v. Society of Lloyd's, 784 F. Supp. 1350, 1355 (N.D. I1. 1992). Section 47
provides criminal sanctions for misleading statements or omissions made knowingly or reck-
lessly. Financial Services Act of 1986, ch. 6, § 47 (1986) (Eng.).
30 Bonny, 3 F.3d at 161.
31 Id.
32 Id. Section 14(3) of the Lloyd's Act of 1982 reads in pertinent part: "[T]he Society
shall not be liable for damages whether for negligence or other tort, breach of duty or other-
wise ... unless the act or omission complained of-(i) was done or omitted to be done in
bad faith ...." Lloyd's Act of 1982, ch. xiv, § 14(3) (1982) (Eng.).
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they] suffice to deter deception of American investors and to induce
the disclosure of material information to investors."33
The Seventh Circuit concluded that "[g]iven the international na-
ture of the transactions involved here, and the availability of remedies
under British law that do not offend the policies behind the [U.S.] se-
curities laws, the parties' forum selection and choice-of-law provisions
contained in the agreements should be given effect."
34
IH. Background Law
The Supreme Court has shown increasing tolerance toward arbi-
tration clauses in agreements involving securities transactions. 3 5 This
part of the Note will track this controversial trend and point out the
significant issues raised by the dissents. The Part will start with the
Court's decision in Wilko v. Swan, which held that the public policy
concerns behind the 1933 Securities Act outweighed the public policy
concerns of the United States Federal Arbitration Act.3 6 Subsequent
cases discussed will show the gradual erosion of the Wilko decision until
it is squarely overruled in Rodriguez de Quijas v. ShearsonlAmerican
Express.3 7
A. Wilko v. Swan
The Supreme Court first addressed the importance of the public
policy concerns of the 1933 and 1934 Acts in Wilko v. Swan.3 8 In Wilko,
a securities customer (petitioner) sued the partners in a securities bro-
kerage firm (respondents) for alleged misrepresentations under Sec-
tion 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933,39 in connection with the sale
of securities.40 The respondents filed a motion to stay the proceedings
pending arbitration pursuant to Section 3 of the United States Arbitra-
tion Act,4 1 because the margin agreements between the parties pro-
33 Bonny, 3 F.3d at 162.
34 Id.
35 See infra notes 60-68, 91-104 & 114-19 and accompanying text.
36 See infra part III.A.
37 See infra parts III.B, C, and D.
38 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
39 See infra note 147.
40 Wilko, 346 U.S. at 428. The petitioner was a U.S. citizen and respondent was a U.S.
corporation. Id.
41 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Section 3 of the United States Arbitration
Act provides in pertinent part:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States
upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such
arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that
the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under
such an agreement, shall- on application of one of the parties stay the trial of
the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of
the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceed-
ing with such arbitration.
Id. § 3 (1988).
1994]
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vided that all future disputes between the parties be settled by
arbitration. 42 The Court denied the respondents' motion based on
the policy behind the Securities Act of 1933 and its conclusion that
enforcing the arbitration agreement would subvert such policy.43
The Court first addressed the policy behind the Securities Act of
1933 and noted that in passing the Act, Congress sought to protect
investors by requiring issuers to provide "full and fair disclosure" to
purchasers of securities. 44 Moreover, the Court adopted petitioner's
argument that Congress' purpose "was to assure that sellers could not
maneuver buyers into a position that might weaken their ability to re-
cover under the Securities Act."45 To ensure this protection,46 an ex-
plicit anti-waiver provision was included in Section 14 of the Act, which
renders void any "condition, stipulation or provision" that results in a
waiver of any rule or regulation of the Act.4 7
The Court next addressed whether an arbitration clause violated
the public policy of the 1933 Act.48 The Court found that the agree-
ment to arbitrate limited the investor's right to select a judicial fo-
rum,49 which "is the kind of 'provision' that cannot be waived under
Section 14 of the Securities Act."50 Although the Court acknowledged
that the United States Arbitration Act established the "desirability of
arbitration as an alternative to the complications of litigation,"51 it
held that such policy was outweighed by the policy concerns of the
1933 Securities Act.52
42 Wiko, 346 U.S. at 429-30.
43 Id. at 438. The Court refused to enforce the arbitration clause notwithstanding the
fact that the arbitrators were bound to apply the provisions of the 1933 and. 1934 Acts. Id.
The Court determined that the effectiveness of the securities laws would be lessened in an
arbitration setting because the summary nature of arbitration awards is often difficult to sub-
ject to judicial review and the power to vacate an award is limited. Id. at 435-37.
44 Id. at 430-31 (citing S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1. (1933)).
45 Id. at 432. The Court noted that "the Securities Act was drafted with an eye to the
disadvantages under which buyers labor .... [Therefore, it is] reasonable for Congress to put
buyers of securities covered by the Act on a different basis from other purchasers." Id. at 435.
46 Id. at 434-35.
47 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1988). Section 14 of the 1933 Act reads in full as follows: "Any
condition, stipulation or provision binding any person acquiring any security to waive compli-
ance with any provision of this subchapter or of the rules and regulations of the Commission
shall be void." Id.
48 WiLko, 346 U.S. at 431-38.
49 Section 22 (a) of the 1933 Act provides in pertinent part: "The district courts of the
United States... shall have jurisdiction of offenses and violations under this subchapter and
under the rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission .. . " 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a)
(1988).
50 Wilko, 346 U.S. at 434-35.
51 Id. at 431.
52 See id. at 438 (stating that "two policies [that are] not easily reconcilable are involved
in this case," but nonetheless holding that an arbitration clause was not valid under the Se-
curities Act of 1933).
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B. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.
1. Justice Stewart for the Majority
Twenty years later the Court reconsidered the enforceability of an
arbitration clause within a securities transaction from an international
perspective in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.53 Scherk involved a U.S. corpo-
ration (respondent) that entered into an agreement with a German
citizen (petitioner) for the purchase of trademarks and stock of three
German corporations. 5 4 The agreement contained representations by
petitioner that the trademarks were unencumbered and also con-
tained an arbitration clause requiring that all disputes would be re-
ferred to arbitration before the International Chamber of Commerce
in Paris applying Illinois law.5 5 Upon the alleged discovery that the
trademarks were subject to substantial encumbrances, respondent filed
suit in a Federal District Court in Illinois seeking damages pursuant to
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule lOb-55 6
promulgated thereunder. 57 Petitioner moved to dismiss or, in the al-
ternative, to stay the proceedings pending arbitration. 58
The district court denied petitioner's motions, and the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed based on the Supreme
Court's decision in Wilko holding that such arbitration clauses were
unenforceable. 59 Applying the international principles supporting its
holding in MIS Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,60 the Supreme Court in a
5-4 decision overruled the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit by
distinguishing Wilko6 ' on the basis that "a truly international" agree-
53 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
54 Id. at 508.
55 Id.
56 See infra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
57 Scherk, 417 U.S. at 509.
58 Id. See supra note 41.
59 Scherk, 417 U.S. at 510. The Supreme Court in Wilko held that the choice of ajudicial
forum was the type of provision that was not waivable under Section 14 of the Securities Act
of 1933. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S 427, 434-35 (1953). See supra notes 38-52 and accompanying
text.
60 407 U.S. 1 (1972). Bremen involved the enforceability of a forum selection clause in a
contract between Zapata Off-Shore Co. (Zapata), an American corporation, and Unterweser,
a German corporation, for the towing of Zapata's rig from Louisiana to Italy. Id. The agree-
ment between the parties contained a forum selection clause, which the Court also presumed
to encompass a choice-of-law provision, designating England as the forum for any dispute
arising under the contract. Id. at 2, 13 n.15. In upholding the validity of the clause and
dismissing the action brought in the United States, the Court stressed the international na-
ture of the contract by noting that "[t]he expansion of American business and industry will
hardly be encouraged if, notwithstanding solemn contracts, we insist on a parochial concept
that all disputes must be resolved under our laws and in our courts." Id. at 9.
61 The Court initially noted that Wiko was different because it was based on § 12(2) of
the 1933 Act, which provides for a private right of redress. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 513. The action
in Scher* was brought under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act, which does not explicitly provide for
such private ight of action. Id. The Court recognized that an implied private right of action
has been upheld by the courts for actions under § 10(h), but noted that the 1934 "Act itself
does not establish the 'special right' that the Court in Wilko found significant." Id. at 514.
19941
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ment was involved in the Scherk case and thus it differed from Wilko in
two respects. 62
First, unlike Wilko, the parties in Scherk faced considerable uncer-
tainty as to the international conflict of laws-which laws would govern
any disputes.63 In light of such uncertainty, the Court noted that such
an agreement is "an almost indispensable precondition to achievement
of the orderliness and predictability essential to any international busi-
ness transaction." 64
Second, the Court found that the reasoning of the Wilko Court
that the buyer surrenders the advantage of choosing the court and
venue was not applicable in this case.05 The Court noted that in an
international contract, if the party opposing litigation in the United
States anticipates such litigation, that party could seek an order in a
foreign court to enjoin the other party from proceeding with the litiga-
tion.66 Regardless of whether or not the foreign order would be up-
held in a U.S. court, the Supreme Court held that "the dicey
atmosphere of such a legal no-man's-land would surely damage the
fabric of international commerce and trade .... ,"67 The majority there-
fore concluded that the arbitration clause should be upheld. 68
2. Justice Douglas for the Dissent
Justice Douglas wrote the dissenting opinion in Scherk in which
Justices White, Brennan and Marshall joined.69 The dissenters agreed
with the Seventh Circuit and held that Section 29 of the 1934 Act70
rendered the arbitration provision unenforceable. 71 The dissent set
forth two basic arguments for this conclusion. First, the dissent argued
that the Securities Act provisions constitute an exception to the United
Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards. Second, the dissent pointed to Section 29(b) of the
1934 Act, which states that "'[e]very contract' made in violation of the
Act 'shall be void'" noting that "[n]o exception is made for contracts
However, the Court acknowledged this was a "colorable" argument and reversed on other
grounds. Id. at 513-15.
62 Id. at 515.
63 Id. at 515-16. The petitioner was a German citizen and the respondent was an Ameri-
can corporation; the signing of the contract took place in Austria; the closing took place in
Switzerland; and negotiations were conducted in America, Germany and England. Id. at 515.
64 Id. at 516.
65 Id. at 518.
66 Id. at 517.
67 Id.
r8 Id. at 519-20.
69 Id. at 521-34.
70 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1988). Section 29 of the 1934 Act is similar to § 14 of the 1933
Act (see supra note 47) and provides the following: "Any condition, stipulation, or provision
binding any person to waive compliance with any provision of this chapter or of any rule or
regulation thereunder, or of any rule of an exchange required thereby shall be void." 15
U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1988).
71 Scherk, 417 U.S. at 525 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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which have an international character."72 Finally, the dissent argued
that, if such a change is to be made, Congress, not the courts, should
be the forum for changing the rules.73
In its first argument, the dissent recognized that Congress' deci-
sion to implement the United Nations Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards reflected an important
public policy in favor of dispute settlement.' 4 However, the dissent
pointed to provisions of that Act that lead to the conclusion that it
"does not substitute an arbiter for the settlement of disputes under the
1933 and 1934 Acts."'75 For example, Article 11(3) of the Convention
states that if a written agreement for arbitration exists,-" [.t] he court...
shall . . . refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the said
agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being per-
formed."76 The dissent reasoned that Section 29(a) rendered the
agreement in question .'void" and "inoperative," 77 noting that "Con-
gress has specified a precise way whereby big and small investors will be
protected and the rules under which the Alberto-Culvers of this Nation
shall operate .... [F]or our corporate giants are not. principalities of
power but guardians of a host of wards unable to care for them-
selves." 78 The dissent further noted that " [w] hen a foreign corporation
undertakes fraudulent action which subjects it .to the jurisdiction of
our federal securities laws, nothing justifies the conclusion that only a
diluted version of those laws protects American investors." 79
Second, the dissent disagreed with the majority's reasoning that
this case was distinguishable from Wilko on the grounds that an inter-
national agreement was involved.80 The dissent was concerned -that
the majority's analysis and focus on the international aspect of the con-
tract could preclude an unsophisticated American investor in a foreign
company or mutual fund, who invested on the basis of fraudulent mis-
72 Id. at 524 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The dissent also dismissed the possibility that
Wilko could be distinguished on the basis that this case involved a sophisticated business as
opposed to an individual investor. Id. at 526-27 (DouglasJ., dissenting). The dissent noted
that "[t]he Act does not speak in terms of 'sophisticated' as opposed to 'unsophisticated'
people dealing in securities" and rightly so since the "victims" of the type of fraud alleged
here are the "thousands of investors" of Alberto-Culver Co. Id. at 526 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
73 Id. at 533 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
74 Id. at 526-27 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
75 Id. at 526-27 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
76 Id. at 527 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing the United Nations Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 3 U.S.T. 2517, 2519, T.I.A.S. No.
6997 (1970)). In addition, Article V(2)(b) also permits nonenforcement of an arbitration
award if it "would be contrary to the public policy of that country." Id. at 527 n.5 (Douglas,J,
dissenting) (citing the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, 3 U.S.T. 2517, 2520, T.I.A.S. No. 6997 (1970)).
77 Scherk, 471 U.S. at 527 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
78 Id. (Douglas, J., dissenting).
79 Id. at 530-31 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
80 Id. at 528-34 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
1994]
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representations in the United States, from seeking redress in the
American court system.81 The majority responded to the dissent's con-
cern by conceding that "situations may arise where the contacts with
foreign countries are so insignificant or attenuated that the holding in
Wilko would meaningfully apply."82 The dissent criticized this conces-
sion, however, in light of the majority's reasoning that order and pre-
dictability were "essential" to any international business transaction.
Presumably under the majority's analysis, if enough contacts with the
United States could be shown, the foreign arbitration clause would not
be upheld, which in effect leads to more uncertainty.83
Finally, the dissent stressed that Congress enacted the 1933 and
1934 Acts to protect investors, and if such protection is to be removed,
it should be done by legislative enactment, not by the courts.8 4 The
dissent noted that "[i] t is important that American standards of fairness
in security dealings govern the destinies of American investors until
Congress changes these standards." 15
C. Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon
1. Justice O'Connor for the Majority
The Supreme Court was again presented with the opportunity to
address the Wilko issue in Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon.86
Unlike Scherk, decided just ten years earlier, this case was even closer to
Wilko because it did not involve international issues.8 7 McMahon in-
volved two individual purchasers of securities (respondents), suing a
security brokerage firm (petitioner) in district court alleging violations
of Section 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934, Rule 1Ob-5, and RICO.88
The petitioner moved to compel arbitration pursuant to a clause con-
tained in the standard customer agreement that any disputes arising
out of the contract would be settled by arbitration.89
The Court held that both the securities and RICO 90 claims were
arbitrable and set forth the following reasons for its decision: (1) the
federal policy of enforcing arbitration agreements is not diminished
merely by a claim founded on statutory grounds;91 (2) Section 27 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is not a substantive provision of
81 Id. (Douglas, J., dissenting).
82 Id. at 517 n.ll (Douglas, J., dissenting).
83 Id. at 529 n. 7 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
84 Id. at 533 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
85 Id. at 528 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
86 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
87 Id. at 232-33. It differed from Wilko only in that it involved allegations of violations of
the 1934 Act while Wilko involved similar violations of the 1933 Act. Id.
88 Id. at 222.
89 Id. at 223-24.
90 This Note will not address the correctness of the Court's decision with respect to the
arbitrability of the petitioner's RICO allegations.
91 McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226.
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that Act for purposes of the anti-waiver provision of Section 29 con-
tained therein;92 and (3) the traditional judicial mistrust of arbitration
proceedings should be dissuaded by changes in the securities regula-
tions that give greater oversight authority to the Securities Exchange
Commission. 93
The Court first noted that the Federal Arbitration Act essentially
established a federal policy in favor of arbitration 94 and that the duty
to enforce arbitration clauses is not diminished solely on the basis that
statutory claims are involved. 95 However, the Court recognized that
this duty to enforce an arbitration clause can be rebutted by a showing
of contrary congressional intent.96 In this case, the respondents ar-
gued that the public policy of the'Securities Exchange Act of 1934 es-
tablished such a contrary intent by Congress. 97
The Court, however, disagreed with respondents' contention that
Section 29(a) (the anti-waiver provision of the 1934 Act) precluded
their waiving a judicial forum.98 The Court held that Section 29(a) is
too narrow to forbid waiver of "any provision" of the Act.99 Instead,
the Court held that it forbids only "waiver of the substantive obliga-
tions imposed by the Exchange Act." 10 0 The Court-then reasoned that
Section 27 of the 1934 Act is not such a substantive provision of the
Act.10 1
Finally, the Court addressed the holding in Wilko that arbitration
could "'weaken [the investor's] ability to recover under the [1933]
Act."' 10 2 The Court noted that even if there were a proper reason for
the Wilko Court to be suspicious of arbitration at the time of its deci-
sion, changes in the securities regulations giving greater oversight to
the Securities Exchange Commission over arbitration procedures
92 Id. at 227-31.
93 Id. at 231-34.
94 Id. at 226 (citing Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S.
1, 24 (1983)).
95 Id.
96 Id. at 226-27. "The burden is on the party opposing arbitration .. .to show that
Congress intended to preclude a waiver ofjudicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue."
Id. at 227.
97 Id. at 227. See supra note 5.
98 McMahon, 482 U.S. at 227. Plaintiffs contended that § 27, which provides that"[t]he
district courts of the United States ... shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations of this
title . . . " is a "condition, stipulation or provision" of the Act that cannot be waived under
§ 29(a). Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1988)).
99 Id. at 227-29.
too Id. at 228.
101 Id. Although this appears to be in direct conflict with Wilko, which held that the right
to select the judicial forum is the type of provision covered by the similar anti-waiver provi-
sion of the 1933 Act, the Court reasoned that Wilko must be read as barring waiver of a
judicial forum only where the arbitration is inadequate to protect the substantive rights at
issue. Id. at 228-29. See infra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
102 McMahon, 482 U.S. at 230 (quoting Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 432 (1953)). See
supra note 43.
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should alleviate such concerns.1 03 The Court therefore concluded that
"Congress did not intend for Section 29(a) to bar enforcement of all
predispute arbitration agreements." 0 4
2. Justice Blackmun for the Dissent
The dissent' 0 5 argued that the Section 10(b) claims were not arbi-
trable for three reasons. First, Congress substantially revised the Secur-
ities Exchange Act of 1934 in 1975, but did not disturb the Wilko
decision or the extended application of that decision by the lower
courts to Section 10(b) claims.1 0 6 The dissent felt that this inaction
should be interpreted as favoring the Wilko decision and its extension
to Section 10(b) claims, particularly since the revisions were intended
to further investor protection.10 7
Second, the Wilko decision was not limited to determining
whether arbitration was sufficient to enforce the "substantive" provi-
sions of the 1933 Act.1 0 8 The dissent felt the majority gave an "unduly
narrow reading of Wilko that ignore[d] the Court's determination [in
Wilko] that the Securities Act was an exception to the Arbitration
Act."' 0 9 The dissent noted that "[t]he Court in Wilko recognized the
policy of investor protection in the Securities Act" and specifically re-
ferred to this policy when it reasoned that a predispute agreement
would constitute a waiver of a provision under Section 29(a) of the
Act." l0
Finally, the suspicions of the Wiko Court against arbitration were
not outdated despite the majority's contrary suggestion."' In fact, the
dissent stated that the need for investor protection was even greater
"when the industry's abuses towards investors are more apparent than
ever."1 12 Although the dissent acknowledged improvements to the ar-
bitration process, it noted that many of the same problems identified
103 McMahon, 482 U.S. at 233. This SEC oversight protection would not be available to
the plaintiffs in Bonny because English laws would govern any arbitration process. See supra
note 9 and accompanying text.
104 McMahon, 482 U.S. at 238.
105 Justices Blackmun, Brennan and Marshall concurred in part and dissented in part
[hereinafter the dissent]. The dissent related entirely to the majority's analysis of the arbi-
trability of the securities violations. Id. at 243 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). Justice Stevens filed
a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part; his disagreement also related to
the securities violations. Id. at 268-69 (StevensJ., dissenting). Justice Stevens noted that the
courts have interpreted the Wiko decision to be applicable to the 1934 Act for thirty-two
years, and any mistake in this interpretation should be left to the legislature for correction.
Id. at 268-69 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
106 Id. at 246-47 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
107 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
108 Id. at 249-57 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
109 Id. at 250 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
110 Id. at 252 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
III Id. at 257-66 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
112 McMahon, 482 U.S. at 243 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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by the Wilko Court still remain. 11 3
D. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.
In another 5-4 decision, the Court finally attempted to set the is-
sue of the arbitrability of Securities Act violations to rest in Rodriguez de
Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.114 by overruling Wilko.1 15 The
action was based on violations of both the 1933 and 1934 Acts. 116 In
overruling Wilko, the Court noted that the Wilko holding was based on
the "outmoded presumption of disfavoring arbitration proceedings"
and that for the reasons set out in McMahon,1 1 7 "[t]here is no sound
basis for construing the prohibition in [Section] 14 on waiving 'compli-
ance with any provision' of the Securities Act to apply to these proce-
dural provisions."118
. The Court also held that it would be inconsistent to require the
1933 Act claims to proceed in court while the 1934 Act claims would be
submitted to arbitration pursuant to its decision in McMahon because
the Acts are meant to be "construed harmoniously because they 'con-
stitute interrelated components of the federal regulatory scheme gov-
erning transactions in securities.'" 1 19 The dissent in Rodriguez de Quijas
would have held that the judicial interpretation of Wilko should not be
disturbed except by an act of Congress. 120
IV. Analysis
The Seventh Circuit's analysis in Bonny relied heavily on the
Supreme Court's trend (discussed in Part III) toward enforcing arbitra-
113 Id. at 257 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). For example, the difficulty of judicial review
due to the summary nature of the arbiters' findings and limited review of arbitration awards
were specifically noted as continuing problems with the arbitration process. Id. at 257-58
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
114 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
115 Id.
116 Id. Petitioners, securities investors, brought suit in district court against respondent,
brokerage firm, for violations of the 1933 and 1934 Acts "alleging that their money was lost in
unauthorized and fraudulent transactions." Id. at 478-79. The standard customer agreement
signed by petitioners included an arbitration clause. Id. at 478. The district court ordered all
of the claims to be submitted to arbitration except for the 1933 Act claims pursuant to the
Supreme Court's ruling in Wilko. Id. at 479. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
reversed and held that the 1933 Act claims should have been submitted to arbitration as well,
noting that Wilko had been effectively rendered obsolete by subsequent decisions. Id. at 479.
117 Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 481. See supra notes 86-104 and accompanying text.
118 Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 482. The Court here refers to the statute's broad
federal venue provisions, availability of nationwide service of process, extinction of the
amount in controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction and the grant of concurrent
jurisdiction. Id.
119 Id. at 484-85 (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 206 (1976)).
120 Id. at 486-87 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent commented that a statutory inter-
pretation by an earlier opinion that has not been amended by Congress for over thirty years
deserves the Court's respect as if it "had been drafted by the Congress itself." Id. at 486 n.2
(quoting Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 268 (1987) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part))..
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tion clauses in international agreements. 121 This reliance, however, is
misplaced for three important reasons. First, the Seventh Circuit ap-
pears to have ignored the distinction between waiving substantive ver-
sus procedural statutory rights. 122 Second, the court incorrectly found
that remedies available in England are substantially the same as the
U.S. securities remedies and therefore adequate to vindicate plaintiffs'
rights. 123 Third, the court did not address whether sufficient contacts
in the United States existed such that the principles of Wilko should
still be applied.1 24 This misplaced reliance has effectively resulted in
the deprivation of the Bonny investors' statutory rights under the 1933
and 1934 Acts.
A. Procedural v. Substantive Rights
As the background material suggests, the Supreme Court has
shown increasing tolerance toward arbitration clauses in agreements
involving securities transactions. 125 The Court has reasoned that such
clauses do not prospectively waive a party's securities act remedies be-
cause giving up ajudicial forum is only a procedural, not a substantive
right under the Acts.' 26 Even if this logic is accepted, 2 7 the rights
involved in Bonny v. Society of Lloyd's128 do not fit within this category of
"procedural" rights.
In contrast with the arbitration clause cases,' 29 Bonny involved fo-
rum selection and choice-of-law clauses.' 30 The Seventh Circuit did
not specifically address whether such clauses related to substantive or
procedural rights under the securities laws. Instead, the court focused
on the international nature of the transaction and applied the princi-
ples behind the Supreme Court's holding in M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-
Shore Co. 131 that international forum selection clauses are presump-
tively valid.' 3 2 In so doing, however, the Seventh Circuit appears to
have ignored important discussions in Supreme Court cases subse-
quent to MIS Bremen that suggest that the presumptive validity of the
121 See supra part Il1.
122 See infra notes 125-40 and accompanying text.
123 See infra text accompanying notes 141-58.
124 See infra text accompanying notes 159-63.
125 See supra notes 60-68, 90-104, 114-19 and accompanying text.
126 See supra notes 98-104 and accompanying text.
127 See supra notes 69-85, 105-13 for a discussion of the dissenting opinions, which dis-
agreed with this contention.
128 Bonny v. Society of Lloyd's, 3 F.3d 156 (1993).
129 See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, 490 U.S. 477 (1989);
Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.,
417 U.S. 506 (1974) (holding that arbitration clauses are enforceable in a securities
transaction).
130 Bonny, 3 F.3d 156.
131 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
132 Bonny, 3 F.3d at 159-60. See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
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forum selection clause would be overcome if the substantive provisions
of the securities acts were prospectively waived.
For example, the Supreme Court in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/
American Express133 stated that "[t] here is no sound basis for construing
the prohibition in [Section 14] waiving 'compliance with any provision'
of the Securities Act to apply to... procedural provisions."' 3 4 In clari-
fying its decision that arbitration clauses were only procedural, the
Court contrasted procedural provisions such as choice of venue, ex-
tinction of amount in controversy, etc.13 5 with the "substantive" provi-
sion "placing on the seller the burden of proof proving lack of scienter
when a buyer alleges fraud."13 6 An analogous "substantive" provision is
found in Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, the violation of
which is the most important allegation of plaintiffs' complaint in
Bonny.13 7 Although the Seventh Circuit in Bonny acknowledged that
enforcement of the forum selection and choice-of-law clauses "will de-
prive plaintiffs of their specific rights under [Section] 12(1) and [Sec-
tion] 12(2) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1933,"138 it
nonetheless held that the clauses were valid.1 3 9 The Supreme Court's
discussion in Rodriguez seems to preclude this conclusion because, by
its own definition, substantive rights were being waived in Bonny.' 40
B. Adequacy of English Law Remedies
Although it is unclear from the court's opinion in Bonny, it is con-
ceivable that the Seventh Circuit did evaluate the substantive/proce-
dural dichotomy by focusing its analysis on the adequacy of remedies
in England to protect the plaintiffs' substantive statutory rights. 14 1 As-
suming this, the Seventh Circuit still failed to adequately address the
issue of whether plaintiffs were prospectively waiving their Securities
Act remedies because the court's analysis ignored the fact that reme-
dies available in England are not substantially similar to U.S. statutory
remedies. The laws of England and the United States are substantially
different in the following important respects: (1) U.S. securities laws
provide lighter scienter and causation requirements; (2) U.S. securities
laws provide a private right of action; (3) U.S. securities laws shift the
burden of proof to the seller to show lack of reasonable care when the
133 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
134 Id. at 482.
135 See supra note 118.
136 Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 481.
137 Bonny v. Society of Lloyd's, 3 F.3d 156, 157 (1993).
138 Id. at 162.
139 Id.
140 See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
141 Bonny, 3 F.3d at 160-62. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit noted that
allowing Lloyd's to avoid liability would contravene American public policy unless remedies
that do not subvert that policy were available in the selected forum. Id. at 160.
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buyer alleges fraud; and (4) U.S. RICO laws provide an opportunity to
recover treble damages.
First, the U.S. securities laws provide more easily established scien-
ter and causation requirements than remedies available under English
law because of the "special position of Lloyd's and its underwriters
under English law." 142 Lloyd's operations are governed by the Lloyd's
Act of 1982.143 This Act exempts the Society of Lloyd's (but not the
underwriters or other members of the Lloyd's community) from dam-
ages from any suit "whether for negligence or other tort, breach of
duty or otherwise . . . unless the act or omission complained of-(i)
was done or omitted to be done in bad faith . .. "144 Although this Act
arguably may preserve the plaintiffs' Section 10(b) claims under the
1934 Act 145 and Rule lOb-5 claims, 146 it precludes recovery under Sec-
tion 12(2) of the 1933 Act, which clearly has no such bad faith
requirement. 147
142 Bonny v. Society of Lloyd's, 784 F. Supp. 1350, 1355 (N.D. III. 1992).
143 See supra note 32.
144 Lloyd's Act of 1982, ch. xiv, § 14(3) (1982) (Eng.).
145 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988). Section 10(b) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails...
To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security regis-
tered.., or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device
or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commis-
sion may prescribe ... in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id.
146 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1993). Rule lOb-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facil-
ity of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading,
or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which oper-
ates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of any security.
Id. The Lloyd's Act may not preserve the plaintiffs' Rule l0b-5 claim because the majority.of
circuit and district courts, including the Seventh Circuit, have held that a good faith reckless
disregard standard satisfies the scienter requirement for such a claim. See Van Dyke v.
Coburn Enterprises, 873 F.2d 1094, 1100 (8th Cir. 1989). The Lloyd's Act, on the other
hand, requires a showing of "bad faith" to establish a claim. See supra note 32.
147 15 U.S.C. § 771 (2) (1988). Section 12 of thle Securities Act of 1933 provides in perti-
nent part:
Any person who-...
offers or sells a security (whether or not exempted by the provisions of
section 77c of this title . . .), by the use of any means . . . in interstate
commerce... by means of a prospectus or oral communication, which
includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a mate-
rial fact... (the purchaser not knowing of such untruth or omission),
and who shall not sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and
in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known . . . shall be
liable to the person purchasing ....
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In addition, Lloyd's and its underwriters are "exempt" persons
under the English Financial Services Act of 1986 (FSA), 148 except for
limited sections of the Act. 149 One section applicable to Lloyd's, Sec-
tion 47, provides "criminal penalties for misleading statements made
knowingly or recklessly." 150 Because this is a criminal penalty only, it is
not available to compensate plaintiffs for the damages they suffered.15'
The Seventh Circuit also noted that plaintiffs have possible causes
of action under English common law for misrepresentation, breach of
contract, and breach of fiduciary duty.152 Although the misrepresenta-
tion action has less rigorous scienter requirements than the English
statutory provisions under the Lloyd's Act or FSA, none of the available
common law actions shift the burden of proof or provide for treble
damages.
Second, U.S. securities laws provide plaintiffs with a private right
of action 153 to enforce their rights as investors. Although Lloyd's is not
exempt from Section 61 of the FSA, and, as the Seventh Circuit noted,
plaintiffs could "potentially" receive "some compensation" for their
damages under this section, Section 61 only applies following a guilty
verdict under Section 47 and requires the Secretary of State to apply to
the court, which is then "permitted" to make remedial orders for past
violations.15 4 This procedure is very different from that applied in the
United States, where the private right of action has been considered to
be a very important.means of "deterring the exploitation of American
investors."155
Third, Section 12(2) of the 1933 Act shifts the burden to the seller
of securities to show that he did not know, or could not have known
through the exercise of reasonable care, of the alleged misstatement
or omission.156 This reasonable care standard is a lower threshold
than scienter, and no similar shift in the burden requirements are
148 Bonny v. Society of Lloyd's, 784 F. Supp. 1350, 1355-56 (N.D.II. 1992). Although
insurance is exempt from registration under the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77c
(a)(8) (1988), it is not exempt from the anti-fraud provision of § 12 (2), 15 U.S.C. § 771
(1988).
149 Bonny, 784 F. Supp. at 1355-56. The sections of the FSA applicable to Lloyd's are
sections 47, 56, 59, and 61. Id.
150 Id. at 1356. It appears that there are geographical limitations included in this section
that would preclude Lloyd's from being held liable, because it essentially only covers misrep-
resentations "made in or from the United Kingdom or that the affected person be in the
United Kingdom." Id.
151 Id. See infra note 154 and accompanying text regarding the applicability of § 61 of
the Financial Services Act and potential for compensation to plaintiffs, barring the geograph-
ical barriers discussed supra note 150 and accompanying text.
152 Bonny v. Society of Lloyd's, 3 F.3d 156, 161 (1993).
153 A private right of action is explicit for §§ 12(1) and 12(2) of the 1933 Securities Act
and an implied right of action has long been recognized for § 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934. See supra note 61.
154 Financial Services Act of 1986, ch. 60, § 61 (1986) (Eng.).
155 Roby v. Corporation of Lloyd's, 996 F.2d 1353, 1364 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114
S.Ct. 385 (1993).
156 Seesupra note 147.
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found in Section 47 of the Financial Services Act of 1986, The Lloyd's
Act of 1982, or English common law.
Fourth, the potential availability of treble damages and payment
of the plaintiffs' attorney fees under RICO 15 7 upon finding of viola-
tions of the U.S. securities laws serves not only as compensation to the
plaintiff but also as an additional deterrence for issuers and dealers in
securities to defraud American investors. 158 Again, no similar provi-
sion is found in the Financial Services Act of 1986, The Lloyd's Act of
1982, or English common law.
In summary, the significant substantive protections afforded by
the U.S. securities laws are unmatched by their English counterparts.
It therefore appears that the Seventh Circuit's analysis fails to satisfac-
torily address the issue that plaintiffs have effectively waived their sub-
stantive statutory remedies under the 1933 and 1934 Acts.
C. Sufficient Contacts Analysis
A final issue not adequately addressed by the Seventh Circuit in
Bonny is the possibility that the solicitation of the plaintiffs in the
United States to invest in Lloyd's would constitute sufficient contacts to
overcome the presumptive validity of the forum selection and choice-
of-law clauses. The majority in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. 159 conceded
that there may be some situations where the foreign contacts are so
"insignificant or attenuated" that the principles of Wilko should still
apply.160 This concession was in response to the dissent's concern in
Scherk that the majority's analysis could result in American investors
being forced to arbitrate their claims in a foreign country despite the
fact that material misrepresentations inducing them to invest in a for-
eign corporation took place in the United States; 161 a fact pattern very
similar to Bonny.162 The Seventh Circuit in Bonny did not address
these comments made in this cautionary dictum by the Supreme
Court, but instead found that there was no question that an interna-
tional agreement was involved in the case.' 63
V. Conclusion
Principles of international comity are reflected in the trend of
Supreme Court cases enforcing international arbitration and forum se-
157 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961,
1964(c) (1988).
158 See Roly, 996 F.2d at 1366 (stating that RICO "seeks to deter persistent misconduct").
159 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
160 Id. at 517 n.l1.
161 Id. at 529-33 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
162 "Kenneth Bonny was solicited by [Robert] King [(principal of Northfield Venture,
Inc., an agent of Lloyd's) ] in Illinois to invest in Lloyd's." Bonny v. Society of Lloyd's, 3 F.3d
156, 162 n.14 (1993). The other plaintiffs were also solicited to invest in Lloyd's in the
United States. Id. at 158.
163 Id.'at 159 n.9.
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lection clauses. In MIS Bremen, the Court stated that we cannot "insist
on a parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved under our
laws and in our courts." 164 Regardless of the cogency of such argu-
ments, they should have no applicability in the securities area when
"substantive" provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts are prospectively
waived. Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 to protect U.S. investors,1 65 and such protec-
tions should not be thwarted by principles of international comity.
The Seventh Circuit's reliance in Bonny on the trend of Supreme
Court decisions favoring enforcement of international arbitration and
forum selection clauses is therefore misplaced.
Moreover, the Seventh Circuit's determination that remedies
available in England were sufficient to vindicate the plaintiffs' statutory
rights and to deter deception of U.S. investors ignores the argument
that "[w ] hen a foreign corporation undertakes fraudulent action which
subjects it to the jurisdiction of our federal securities laws, nothingjus-
tifies the conclusion that only a diluted version of those laws protects
American investors."1 66 The U.S. Securities laws offer better protec-
tion for U.S. investors than their English counterparts.1 67
Finally, if the protections of the U.S. Securities Acts are to be
taken away, it should be done only by act of Congress. The discretion
of the courts should not be permitted to return U.S. investors in for-
eign markets to the principle of caveat emptor.
JENNIFER M. ECK
164 M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972).
165 See supra note 5.
166 Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 530-31 (1974).
167 See supra notes 141-58 and accompanying text.
19941

